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INTRODUCTION 
In a 2010 decision out of the Tenth Circuit, an injunction against the 
Roadless Area Conservation regulations, known as the “Roadless 
Rule,”1 was reversed, representing an important step in finally 
solidifying federal protection of the inventoried “roadless areas.” The 
Roadless Rule prohibits road construction, reconstruction, and timber 
harvesting in designated areas.2 Between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, 
there are now two major circuit decisions recognizing the validity of the 
Roadless Rule. These decisions are significant partly because they were 
decided by the two circuits most deeply impacted by the Roadless Rule, 
and are thus the most crucial in its survival. The Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits contain, respectively, the first and second largest National 
Forest lands areas subject to the Roadless Rule among judicial circuits.3 
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 1.  Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244 (Jan. 12, 
2001) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294 (2012)) [hereinafter Roadless Rule]. 
 2.  Id. 
 3. See 2001 Roadless Rule Maps, U.S. FOREST SERV., http://www.fs.fed.us 
/maps/ (follow “Roadless Area Conservation Maps” hyperlink) (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2012) (The U.S. Forest Service manages more than 190 million acres, of 
which nearly 58 million are inventoried roadless areas. Almost sixty percent of 
these managed areas, or 122,092,000 acres to be specific, are located within the 
Ninth Circuit, 43,274,000 of which are inventoried roadless areas; 41,758,000 
acres of National Forest lands are located within the Tenth Circuit’s jurisdiction, 
13,313,000 of which are inventoried roadless areas. Thus, between them, the 
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Prior to the recent Tenth Circuit decision, the Roadless Rule 
endured many political and legal challenges.4  Although the unanimous 
circuit decisions staved off the Roadless Rule’s permanent enjoinment, 
the State of Alaska is currently attempting to essentially re-try the case 
in a new forum.5 This Article focuses on the Roadless Rule’s history6 and 
ongoing litigation7, discussing the decisions upholding the Roadless 
Rule in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. Finally, it analyzes Alaska’s 
pending challenge in the District Court for the District of Columbia and 
the Roadless Rule’s likely treatment should it reach the Supreme Court.8 
I. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE ROADLESS RULE 
The Organic Administration Act of 18979 established the national 
forest system, and articulated a directive of the Forest Service: “No 
national forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the 
forest within . . . or for the purpose of . . . furnish[ing] a continuous 
supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens . . . .”10 From this 
auspicious beginning, with two apparently competing interests to 
balance, the Forest Service is mandated to provide the public with access 
to and use of its forest lands, while simultaneously working to preserve, 
improve, and protect them. 
Subsequently, the Wilderness Act of 196411 (“Wilderness Act”) 
 
Ninth and Tenth Circuit jurisdictions contain the vast majority of National 
Forests and Roadless lands, rendering the decisions by these circuits especially 
relevant in terms of the Roadless Rule’s future). 
 4. See Timeline of the Roadless Rule, EARTH JUSTICE, 
http://earthjustice.org/features/timeline-of-the-roadless-rule (last visited Nov. 
6, 2012) (containing a timeline showing various executive efforts to either 
suspend or bolster the Roadless Rule). 
 5. See Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 1:11-cv-01122 (D.D.C. filed June 
17, 2011) (State of Alaska claiming that the Roadless Rule violates multiple 
National Acts); see also discussion infra Part II. 
 6. See generally Timeline of the Roadless Rule, supra note 4. 
 7. See generally TOM TURNER, ROADLESS RULES: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE LAST 
WILD FORESTS (2009) (reviewing the history of the Roadless Rule and related 
litigation). 
 8. It merits noting that the Supreme Court very recently refused to grant 
certiorari for a Tenth Circuit decision on the Roadless Rule. Wyoming v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., 414 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, No. 11-1378, 568 
U.S. ___ (Oct. 1, 2012); see U.S. Supreme Court Leaves Roadless Rule Standing, 
ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 2, 2012, 11:57 AM), http://ens-
newswire.com/2012/10/02/u-s-supreme-court-leaves-roadless-rule-standing/ 
(describing Roadless Rule and the appellate history of the case). Nevertheless, 
the threat of future review by the Supreme Court remains. 
 9. Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2012). 
 10. Id. 
  11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–36 (2006). 
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established a procedure by which Congress can designate roadless areas 
as “wilderness,”12 which had the effect of keeping them in a primitive 
state in perpetuity.13 Looking to preserve and protect forest lands, the 
Forest Service began the Roadless Areas Review and Evaluation (“RARE 
I”) in 1967—the first attempt to inventory the roadless areas within the 
national forest system with the goal of ultimately recommending certain 
lands to Congress as appropriate for wilderness designation.14 Almost 
ten years later, in 1976, after a district court outlawed clear-cutting 
nationwide,15 Congress passed the National Forestry Management Act16 
(“NFMA”), “allow[ing] the Forest Service to resume clear-cutting with 
certain restrictions” and accomplish its other interest.17 NFMA required 
the Forest Service to “develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise land 
and resource management plans for units of the National Forest 
System . . . . “18 
In 1977, the Forest Service began RARE II, its second attempt to 
inventory the roadless areas within its jurisdiction.19 This effort, 
however, was short-lived; a successful court challenge, brought under 
the National Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”)20 against the 
Forest Service’s wilderness designation procedure, halted any further 
action by the Forest Service.21  When it became clear that there would be 
no RARE III, Congress took control of roadless area policy by enacting 
numerous bills to establish wilderness designations on a state-by-state 
 
 12. Id. § 1132(c). 
 13. Id. § 1131(a)–(c); see also TURNER, supra note 7, at 22 (noting that the 
Wilderness Act immediately set aside 9.1 million acres of national forest land 
and gave Congress the power to set aside more unspoiled areas). 
 14. See 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (describing the process of review). 
 15. See generally W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Butz, 367 
F. Supp. 422 (N.D. W. Va. 1973) aff’d, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975). 
 16. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–14 (2012). 
 17.  TURNER, supra note 7, at 23 (citing Butz, 367 F. Supp. at 422). 
 18. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a). 
 19. See Christopher Cumings, Judicial Iron Triangles: The Roadless Rule to 
Nowhere—And What Can be Done to Free the Forest Service’s Rulemaking Process, 61 
OKLA. L. REV. 801, 805–06 (2008) (RARE II was completed in 1979; the inventory 
identified 62 million acres as roadless areas within the national forest system 
and recommended to Congress 15.1 million acres as appropriate for wilderness 
designation). 
 20. National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2012)  
(NEPA establishes a national environmental policy and goals for the protection, 
maintenance, and enhancement of the environment. It also provides a process 
for implementing these goals and a series of procedural requirements that 
safeguard the constitutionality and legitimacy of any major federal 
environmental action.). 
 21. See generally California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
the Forest Service was not properly complying with NEPA). 
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basis.22 
In 1998, a survey revealed that the Forest Service faced an $8.4 
billion backlog of road maintenance and construction.23  A year later, the 
Forest Service Chief published the “Interim Roadless Rule,” placing an 
eighteen-month moratorium on road building in national roadless 
areas.24  In a move met with wide public support,25 the Clinton 
administration promulgated the “Roadless Area Conservation” 
regulations, known as the “Roadless Rule.”  The Roadless Rule, 
eventually adopted and made effective on March 13, 2001, established 
lasting protection for inventoried roadless areas in the National Forest 
System.26  It set limits on road construction, reconstruction, and timber 
harvesting in designated areas, stating that these activities have the 
greatest potential for altering and fragmenting landscapes, which, in 
turn, would lead to immediate and long-term decline in the value and 
characteristics of roadless areas.27 The environment’s health was in need 
of serious consideration on a national level, and, to that end, the Forest 
Service was granted authority to examine the “whole picture” of land 
management for roadless areas by implementing a nationwide 
management system.28 
In essence, the Roadless Rule forbids road construction and logging 
 
 22.  See, e.g., Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 
96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 43 U.S.C.); 
California Wilderness Act of 1984, 16 U.S.C. § 543; Oregon Wilderness Act of 
1984, 16 U.S.C. § 460oo (2012); Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984, 16 
U.S.C. § 460pp (2012). 
 23. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ROADLESS AREA CONSERVATION FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT VOLUME 1, at 1–5 (2000) (“Agency has an 
$8.4 billion backlog in deferred maintenance, road reconstruction, and bridge 
and culvert maintenance and replacement on the more than 386,000 miles in the 
Forest Transportation System.”). 
 24. Administration of the Forest Development Transportation System: 
Temporary Suspension of Road Construction and Reconstruction in Unroaded 
Areas, 36 C.F.R. § 212 (2012); see also Wyo. Timber Indus. Ass’n v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Wyo. 2000) (challenging the interim rule). 
 25. See TURNER, supra note 7, at 35. Over one hundred members of Congress 
wrote to the president urging protection for roadless areas, and over a quarter-
million emails supporting the moratorium crashed White House servers in a 
single weekend in June 1999. Id. 
 26. Roadless Rule, supra note 1, at 3244. 
 27. Id. at 3245 (The Roadless Rule discusses concerns for high quality or 
undisturbed soil, water, and air; sources of public drinking water; diversity of 
plant and animal communities; habitats for threatened and endangered species 
or those dependent on large areas of land; motorized and semi-primitive 
motorized classes of dispersed recreation; reference landscapes; natural 
landscapes with scenic quality; cultural properties and sacred sites; and other 
locally identified unique characteristics.). 
 28. Id. at 3246. 
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in inventoried roadless areas, which comprise about one third (58.5 
million acres) of the National Forest System.29 The rule had two 
elements: a “Prohibition Rule,” which banned road construction and 
reconstruction in inventoried roadless areas, and a “Procedural Rule,” 
which required forest managers to identify additional roadless areas and 
determine whether they warranted elevated protection.30 
The Roadless Rule does not restrict access to inventoried roadless 
areas, but instead prevents the construction of new roads and 
reconstruction of existing roads.31 It does not, as some assume, prohibit 
any sort of activity or development in an area, eliminating all economic 
use the land could provide.  
Furthermore, the Roadless Rule includes several exceptions to the 
general prohibition against roadbuilding and timber harvesting in 
inventoried roadless areas. It allows for forest management activities 
that do not require the construction of new roads,32 construction or 
reconstruction of roads when necessary for public safety, response 
actions, and other events,33 and even allows for certain exceptions to the 
general prohibition against timber harvesting in roadless areas.34  
Moreover, the Roadless Rule was intended to have a negligible real 
impact on timber sales nationwide, as the industry had already 
experienced sharp declines in the previous decade. To that end, the 
availability of timbered lands would not be affected.35 
A.  The First Challenges to the Roadless Rule in Court 
The State of Idaho was the first to challenge the proposed rule, 
claiming that the Forest Service’s scoping process violated NEPA,36 but 
 
 29. Id. at 3244–45. 
 30.  Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,276, 30,288 
(May 10, 2000). 
 31. See Roadless Rule, supra note 1, at 3249–50 (“[T]he final rule merely 
prohibits the construction of new roads and the reconstruction of existing roads 
in inventoried roadless areas.”). 
 32. Id. at 3250 (“[M]anagement actions that do not require the construction of 
new roads will still be allowed . . . .”). 
 33. Id. at 3272–73 (listing circumstances under which a road may be 
constructed). 
 34. Id. at 3273 (listing circumstances under which timber can be cut, sold, 
and removed in roadless areas). 
 35. TURNER, supra note 7, at 36. 
 36. Scoping is required by NEPA regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2012) 
(“There shall be an early and open process for determining the scope of issues to 
be addressed and for identifying the significant issues related to a proposed 
action.”). 
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the suit was dismissed.37 On January 8, 2001, only three days after the 
Roadless Rule took effect, the Kootenai Tribe and others filed suit in the 
District of Idaho, alleging that the Roadless Rule was illegal and violated 
both NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act.38 Before the District 
Court published its opinion, President Bush postponed the Roadless 
Rule’s effective date to May 12, 2001.39 
The State of Alaska also challenged the Roadless Rule. Specifically, 
Alaska sought to prevent its application to the Tongass National Forest, 
and, ultimately, the state reached a separate settlement with the Forest 
Service promulgating a new rule exempting the Tongass from the 
Roadless Rule.40 This was a huge setback for the Roadless Rule, given 
that the Tongass National Forest is the country’s largest tract of national 
forest land; under the Tongass exemption Alaska was essentially 
removed from the Roadless Rule’s reach.41 However, this out of court 
settlement did not affect other states, and Idaho’s challenge continued. 
Despite postponement of the effective date, the Idaho District Court 
issued a nationwide injunction.42 The Ninth Circuit subsequently 
vacated the injunction, holding that the district court had abused its 
discretion in enjoining the rule.43 The Court of Appeals determined that 
beyond providing adequate notice, the affirmative duties NEPA 
imposes are actually rather limited, so that the plaintiff’s allegations of 
procedural invalidity44 were insufficient to support an injunction.45 The 
 
 37. Idaho v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV99-611-N-EJL, 2000 WL 33417326, at *1 
(D. Idaho Feb. 18, 2000). 
 38. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1236 (D. 
Idaho 2001) [hereinafter Kootenai I]. 
 39. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 2002), 
abrogated in part on other grounds by Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 
F.3d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Kootenai II]. 
 40. See Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Release No. 0200.03, USDA Retains 
National Forests Roadless Area Conservation Rule (June 9, 2003); see also Special 
Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to the Tongass National 
Forest, Alaska, 68 Fed. Reg. 75, 136 (Dec. 30, 2003) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 
294) (temporarily exempting the Tongass National Forest from prohibitions 
against timber harvest, road construction, and reconstruction in inventoried 
roadless areas). 
 41. Until last year, Alaska found itself removed from the litigation 
surrounding the Roadless Rule. A District Court decision reinstating the 
Roadless Rule in the Tongass, discussed infra Part II.3, and a renewed challenge 
to the Rule in the District of Columbia have brought Alaska back into the 
ongoing litigation of the Rule. 
 42. See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, No. CV01-10-N-EJL, 2001 WL 
1141275, at *2 (D. Idaho May 10, 2001) (“The Forest Service is HEREBY 
ENJOINED from implementing all aspects of the Roadless Area Conservation 
Rule.”) (emphasis in original). 
 43. Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1104. 
 44. See id. at 1117 (The plaintiffs complained that the Forest Service violated 
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Court of Appeals also held that the Forest Service was not required to 
issue a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for the 
addition of 4.2 million acres of previously unidentified roadless areas to 
the final EIS.46  
Most importantly, the Court of Appeals held that the Forest Service 
impact statements analyzed an adequate range of alternatives as 
required by NEPA,47 and held that the Forest Service was not required 
under NEPA to consider alternatives in its EIS that were inconsistent 
with its basic policy objectives.48 Since the decision was published, the 
greatest criticisms have focused on the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the 
Roadless Rule’s purpose, particularly the panel’s unsupported claims 
that “the policy of NEPA is first and foremost to protect the natural 
environment.”49 Although critics claim that this is an overbroad and 
liberal reading of NEPA’s language that offers unfounded support for a 
bad rule, the Ninth Circuit’s decision granted the Forest Service the 
same presumption of lawful rulemaking that many agencies enjoy in 
court.50 The Ninth Circuit also held that the Forest Service’s 
promulgation of the Roadless Rule complied with Congress’s intent in 
drafting NEPA.51 This was the first clear affirmation of the Roadless 
Rule’s constitutionality, a good indicator of its long-term legitimacy and 
survival (at least within the Ninth Circuit), and a major victory for its 
supporters. 
The State of Wyoming filed its own suit challenging the rule, and a 
federal district court enjoined the rule’s nationwide application in July 
2003, reaching its own finding that the Forest Service had violated 
NEPA and the Wilderness Act.52 However, after the Bush administration 
 
NEPA’s “hard look” requirement by not providing maps of the potential 
affected areas at the scoping period. The Court disagreed, noting that the Forest 
Service had provided maps of the affected areas prior to issuing the draft EIS 
and had been engaged in ongoing studies and discussions with the plaintiffs for 
several years.). 
 45. Id. at 1104. 
 46. Id. at 1118. 
 47. Id. at 1120 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14). 
 48. Id. at 1121–22. 
 49. See id. at 1123 (“NEPA may not be used to preclude lawful conservation 
measures by the Forest Service and to force federal agencies, in contravention of 
their own policy objectives, to develop and degrade scarce environmental 
resources.”). 
 50. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
866 (1984) (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory 
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s 
policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by 
Congress, the challenge must fail.”). 
 51. Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1120. 
 52. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1239 (D. Wyo. 
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passed the State Petition Rule53 in 2005, all pending legal challenges to 
the Roadless Rule were rendered moot, and the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals vacated the Wyoming district court’s 2003 injunction.54 
B.  The Effective Repeal of the Roadless Rule by the State Petition 
Act 
The new State Petition Act, dramatically different from the 
Roadless Rule, allowed governors from each state with roadless areas to 
petition the Secretary of Agriculture to establish their own management 
plans for roadless areas.55  Individual state action allowed for greater 
flexibility, but also for far greater exceptions in terms of destruction of 
forested lands.56 
The Forest Service explained that the state petitioning process 
established by the new rule would “allow State-specific consideration of 
the needs of these areas,”57 with the purpose of “[setting] forth a process 
for State-specific rulemaking to address the management of inventoried 
roadless areas . . . .”58 The Forest Service also explained that because the 
State Petition Rule was “merely procedural in nature and in scope” and 
thus would have “no direct, indirect, or cumulative effect on the 
environment,” it could be categorically excluded from the procedural 
requirements of NEPA.59  Under this exclusion, the Forest Service could 
implement the rule without complying with even the most basic 
requirements of NEPA, including the crucial EIS.60 
 
2003), vacated 414 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 53. See generally Special Areas; State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area 
Management, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,654 (May 13, 2005) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294). 
 54. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 414 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, No. 11-1378, 568 U.S. ___ (Oct. 1, 2012). 
 55. Notably, the regulations provided no standards or criteria to guide the 
Secretary of Agriculture in responding to a petition. See William J. Wailand, A 
New Direction? Forest Service Decisionmaking and Management of National Forest 
Roadless Areas, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 418, 418 (2006) (suggesting that the absence of 
standards may reflect an attempt to open roadless areas to development). 
 56.  See Special Areas; State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area 
Management, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,654. One concern regarding the Roadless Rule 
was “the need for flexibility and exceptions to allow for needed resource 
management activities,” because the “inflexible ‘one-size-fits-all’ nationwide 
rulemaking approach is flawed and there are better means to achieve protection 
of roadless area values.” Id. at 25,656. 
 57. Id. at 25,655. 
 58. Id. at 25,661 (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294.10). 
 59. Id. at 25,660. 
 60. Id. (“[T]he Department’s assessment is that this final rule falls within 
FSH 1909.15, Section 31.1b and no extraordinary circumstances exist which 
would require preparation of an environmental assessment or an environmental 
impact statement.”). 
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The Forest Service had clearly anticipated challenges to the 2005 
rule, and therefore included a severability provision in the Roadless 
Rule to keep in effect any portions not invalidated pursuant to judicial 
review, and to block reinstatement of the old Roadless Rule.61  Several 
states, including California, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington, 
almost immediately brought suit against the United States Department 
of Agriculture (“USDA”) and the Forest Service alleging violations of 
NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, and the rationality requirement of 
the Administrative Procedure Act.62 
C.  Reinstatement of the Roadless Rule in the Ninth Circuit and 
Injunction in the Tenth Circuit 
The Northern District of California invalidated the State Petition 
Act and reinstated the Roadless Rule in 2006.63 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, holding that the Forest Service had violated both NEPA and 
the Endangered Species Act by adopting an approach to roadless area 
management in 2005 that was less protective of the environment than 
the approach reflected in the 2001 Roadless Rule, without considering 
the effects of the change on the environment as required under either 
statute.64 
Wyoming brought suit in response to the California District Court 
decision, and successfully enjoined the revitalization of the Rule.65 A 
District Court in Washington issued a decision presuming that the 2001 
Roadless Rule nevertheless remained in force, and went unchallenged.66  
In response, the California District Court modified the scope of its 
nationwide injunction, as a matter of judicial comity, so that the 
 
 61. Id. at 25,656 (“The Department wishes to make its intent clear that should 
all or any part of this regulation be set aside, the Department does not intend 
that the prior rule be reinstated, in whole or in part.”); see also 36 C.F.R. § 294.18 
(2005) (“In the event that any provision . . . is determined . . . to be invalid . . . the 
remaining provisions . . . shall remain in full force and effect.”). 
 62. See generally California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp. 
2d 874 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 63. Id. at 916. 
 64. California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th 
Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Lockyer] (holding that the USDA and the Forest Service 
violated NEPA by failing to comply with the environmental analysis 
requirement, violated the Endangered Species Act by failing to engage in the 
proper consultation before implementing the State Petitions Rule, and that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by enjoining the State Petitions Rule 
and reinstating the Roadless Rule); see also discussion infra Part II.1. 
 65. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1350–55 (D. Wyo. 
2008). 
 66. Hogback Basin Pres. Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1146 
(W.D. Wash. 2008). 
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injunction of the State Petition Act was narrowly applied only within the 
Ninth Circuit and in New Mexico.67  States outside the Ninth Circuit 
began the process of requesting the Secretary of Agriculture to issue 
individual state determinations.68 
II. LOCKYER AND WYOMING: HOW THE NINTH AND TENTH 
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS FINALLY GOT IT RIGHT 
A. The Lockyer Court Enjoins the State Petition Act 
In Lockyer, the Ninth Circuit considered how the State Petitions 
Rule promulgated by the USDA affected the Roadless Rule.69 Although 
courts must generally defer to administrative agencies unless their 
actions are “arbitrary and capricious,”70 the Ninth Circuit noted that the 
State Petitions Rule effectively repealed the Roadless Rule, and thus 
should be subject to review under NEPA71 because  its implementation 
could not be considered “procedural only.”72 Consequently, since a 
drastic change in regulation, such as effectively repealing the Roadless 
Rule, was certainly enough to trigger NEPA public notice and comment, 
the court found that the USDA did not properly assert a valid reason for 
its classification of the State Petitions Rule as a categorical exemption 
under NEPA.73 The court further found that the USDA had violated 
NEPA by arbitrarily determining that the State Petitions Rule would 
have no effect on listed species or habitats.74 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court of the 
Northern District of California did not abuse its discretion by reinstating 
the Roadless Rule,75 stating that “[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature, 
 
 67. California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 710 F. Supp. 2d 916, 924 
(N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 68. See, e.g., Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to the 
National Forests in Idaho, 73 Fed. Reg. 1135 (Jan. 7, 2008) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 
294); Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to the National 
Forests in Colorado, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,544 (July 25, 2008) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 
294). 
 69. See Lockyer, 575 F.3d at 1011 (describing “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard for review). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 1014–17 (stating “the promulgation of the State Petitions Rule 
necessarily encompassed the permanent repeal of the Roadless Rule’s 
substantive protections” yet “the USDA could cite no occasion when [NEPA’s] 
categorical exclusion was used to repeal a rule with substantive effects on land 
management”). 
 72. Id. at 1016–17. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1019. 
 75. Id. at 1020. 
RONHOLT_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2012  5:30 PM 
2012 ROADLESS RULE 247 
can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and . . . , 
therefore, the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of an 
injunction to protect the environment.”76 Alone among the Circuit 
Courts of Appeal, the Ninth Circuit considers the invalidation of an 
agency rule to cause the agency’s prior rule to be reinstated.77 Under this 
precedent, the court concluded that the District Court rightfully 
reinstated the Roadless Rule in order to prevent further harm to roadless 
areas, gave meaningful consideration to the balancing of harm, and as 
such there was no abuse of discretion.78 
B.  The Tenth Circuit Reverses the Permanent Injunction of the 
Roadless Rule  
Contrary to expectations,79 the Tenth Circuit reversed the District 
Court of Wyoming’s injunction of the Roadless Rule. The Appeals Court 
reviewed de novo the State of Wyoming’s challenge to the Roadless Rule, 
and held that the Roadless Rule did not contravene the Wilderness Act,80 
the Forest Service had acted within its authority under the Organic Act 
and the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (“MUSYA”)81 to regulate 
National Forest lands,82 and the Forest Service fully complied with the 
requirements of NEPA.83 
Although the Tenth Circuit tracked the opinion of the lower court, 
evaluating the same arguments with the same evidence, it emerged with 
vastly divergent results.84 Comparing the aims of the Wilderness Act 
with those of the Roadless Act, the court determined that the two acts 
are not functionally equivalent and the Roadless Rule does not violate 
the Wilderness Act by creating de facto wilderness.85 The Tenth Circuit 
echoed the Ninth Circuit in holding that the Forest Service possesses 
 
 76. Id. (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 
545 (1987)). 
 77.  Id. (quoting Paulson v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
76. Id. 
 79. See Kyle J. Aarons, Note, The Real World Roadless Rules Challenges, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 1293, 1311 (2011) (providing a lively defense of the merits of the 
District Court of Wyoming’s opinion enjoining the Roadless Rule and 
predictions that the 10th Circuit would affirm District Judge Brimmer’s opinion). 
 80. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 661 F.3d 1209, 1234 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 81. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528–31. 
 82. Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1235. 
 83. Id. at 1253–54. 
 84. Id. at 1228–42. 
 85. Id. at 1229–30. The Court also pointed out that the Roadless Rule, which 
provides broader exceptions for when new road construction or reconstruction 
can occur, is less restrictive in terms of “grazing,” and allows for mineral 
development to a greater extent than the Wilderness Act. Id. at 1232–33. 
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broad discretion to regulate national forests, including for conservation 
purposes.86 
1. The Roadless Rule did not violate the Wilderness Act because it did 
not establish de facto wilderness areas 
In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit evaluated Wyoming’s claim that 
the Roadless Rule constituted a de facto designation of “wilderness” in 
contravention of the Wilderness Act.”87 The court analyzed the language 
of both regulations, noting that the Wilderness Act defined “wilderness” 
as “an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled 
by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain,” as well as 
“an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character 
and influence, without permanent improvements or human 
habitation.”88 
As previously discussed, the Wilderness Act prohibits any 
“permanent” or “temporary road,” and road maintenance activities, 
subject to limited exceptions, and prohibits any use of motor vehicles.89 
On the other hand, the Roadless Rule restricts only road construction 
and commercial timber harvesting, while allowing existing classified 
roads90 to be maintained.  
The court ultimately held that “[t]hese distinctions clearly 
demonstrate that wilderness areas governed by the Wilderness Act and 
[inventoried roadless areas] governed by the Roadless Rule are not only 
distinct, but that the Wilderness Act is more restrictive and prohibitive 
than the Roadless Rule.”91 Since “the [inventoried roadless areas] 
governed by the Roadless Rule are not de facto administrative wilderness 
areas,” the court determined the district court erred by holding 
otherwise.92  
2. The Roadless Rule Was Promulgated Pursuant to Broad Authority 
Granted by Congress in the Organic Act 
The court next addressed “whether the Forest Service otherwise 
acted within its statutory authority in promulgating the Roadless 
Rule.”93 The court found that “[t]he Organic Act gives the Forest Service 
broad discretion to regulate the national forests, including for 
 
 86. Id. at 1270. 
 87. Id. at 1229. 
 88. Id. at 1228. 
 89. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2012); 36 C.F.R. § 293.6. 
 90. Protection of Inventoried Roadless Areas, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3250–51 
(Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294.12(c)). 
 91.  Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1233. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1234. 
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conservation purposes[,]”94 and this broad rulemaking authority 
granted to the Forest Service under the Organic Act “is alone sufficient 
to support the Forest Service’s promulgation of the Roadless Rule.”95 
The court continued its analysis, further finding support in 
MUSYA, which grants the Forest Service broad discretion in its 
authority to manage NFS lands,96 and states that “establishment and 
maintenance of areas of wilderness are consistent with the purposes and 
provisions of [the Act],”97 “to be supplemental to, but not in derogation 
of,” the Organic Act.98  The Court of Appeals finally concluded that “the 
Forest Service had the authority . . . to promulgate a rule protecting NFS 
lands through restrictions on commercial logging and road 
construction” under both the Organic Act and MUSYA.99 
Wyoming reasserted its MUSYA claim as an alternate ground for 
affirming the district court’s injunction of the Roadless Rule, arguing 
that the Roadless Rule was inconsistent with MUSYA purposes because 
it applied a “one size fits all approach.”100 The court, however, noted 
that “contrary to Wyoming’s argument, the [Roadless Rule] conforms to 
the multiple-use mandate of MUSYA, including management of NFS 
lands for ‘outdoor recreation,’ ‘watershed,’ and ‘wildlife and fish 
purposes.’”101 The Court admitted that “the Roadless Rule does not 
permit all uses specifically identified in MUSYA—namely, ‘timber’ 
purposes” but correctly pointed out that this is not required under 
MUSYA.102  The Forest Service has acted properly under the limitations 
of both the Organic Act and MUSYA in promulgating the Roadless Rule. 
3. The Forest Service Complied with the Mandates of NEPA and Did 
Not Act Arbitrarily and Capriciously in Conducting Its NEPA 
Analysis. 
The court then reviewed NEPA. Wyoming asserted that in 
promulgating the Roadless Rule, the Forest Service violated the NEPA 
by failing to: conduct adequate scoping, grant Wyoming cooperating-
agency status, consider a reasonable range of alternatives, consider the 
cumulative impacts of the proposed action, prepare a supplemental EIS 
and take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1235 (internal citations omitted). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 529 (2012). 
 98. Id. § 528. 
 99. Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1235. 
 100. Id. at 1266–67. 
 101. Id. at 1267–68. 
 102. Id. at 1268. 
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action.103 Several of these arguments were summarily struck down, so 
only the most crucial to the Rule’s legitimacy and to its future 
defensibility will be discussed. 
a. The Forest Service reasonably limited the range of alternatives 
to those that furthered the defined purpose of the Roadless Rule 
The district court’s opinion contains a noticeable thread of bias, 
resulting in a flawed opinion that erroneously found every Forest 
Service decision arbitrary and capricious regardless of the record. The 
district court had held that the Forest Service violated NEPA by 
“‘fail[ing] to rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable 
alternatives’” to the proposed action.104 The Tenth Circuit, however, 
found that the Forest Service “satisfied NEPA’s requirements by 
analyzing a full range of reasonable alternatives that would satisfy” the 
purpose of the Roadless Rule.105 As the court stated, “[u]nder NEPA, our 
role in reviewing the Forest Service’s EIS ‘is simply to ensure that the 
agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental 
impact of its actions.’”106 The court concluded that the Forest Service 
considered a reasonable range of alternatives in detail in the EIS, 
reasonably limited those alternatives for consideration to the ones that 
furthered the defined purpose of the Roadless Rule, and gathered 
sufficient information to “take a hard look at the environmental impacts 
of the proposed [rule] and its alternatives.” 107 
b. The Forest Service did not impermissibly predetermine the 
outcome of the Roadless Rule proceeding 
The last section of the appellate court’s NEPA analysis is 
noteworthy, because it begins by stating that even if the district court 
were correct that “the end-product of the Roadless Rule NEPA process 
was ‘predetermined’ and ‘preordained,’ it never decisively concluded 
that ‘predetermination’ or ‘bias’ constituted a separate ground for relief 
under NEPA.”108  In fact, “[i]n analyzing the environmental impacts of a 
proposed action under NEPA, agency officials are not required to be 
‘subjectively impartial.’”109 
The regulations promulgated by the Center for Environmental 
Quality, the reviewing body for the Environmental Protection Agency 
 
 103. Id. at 1237. 
 104. Id. at 1243. 
 105. Id. at 1243, 1247. 
 106. Id. at 1256–57. 
 107. Id. at 1250. 
 108. Id. at 1263. 
 109. Id. (emphasis added). 
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and other environmental agencies, expressly indicate that an “‘agency can 
have a preferred alternative in mind when it conducts a NEPA 
analysis[,]’”110 so long as the agency takes the requisite “hard look” 
under NEPA.111 The court, defining “predetermination” as occurring 
only when an agency “irreversibly and irretrievably commits itself to a 
plan of action that is dependent upon the NEPA environmental analysis 
producing a certain outcome,”112 makes it clear that “predetermination 
is different in kind from mere ‘subjective impartiality[,]’” which “‘does 
not undermine an agency’s ability to engage in the requisite hard look at 
environmental consequences . . . .’”113 
After reviewing the record, the court concluded that “the Forest 
Service did not irreversibly and irretrievably commit itself to a certain 
outcome before it had completed it NEPA analysis.”114 Wyoming 
“simply [did] not satisfy the stringent standard applicable to claims of 
predetermination under NEPA.”115 The Forest Service did not act 
arbitrarily and capriciously in conducting its NEPA analysis in 
promulgating the Roadless Rule.116 
In its final order, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court 
abused its discretion in permanently enjoining the Roadless Rule on a 
nationwide basis.117 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed,118 bringing 
the Tenth Circuit in line with the Ninth Circuit and effectively 
reestablishing the Roadless Rule nationwide. 
III. ALASKA IN THE FEDERAL COURTS AND ITS POSSIBLE EFFECT 
ON CIRCUIT SPLIT  
In June 2011, the State of Alaska filed the most recent challenge to 
the Roadless Rule in the District of Columbia District Court.119 This suit 
was brought both in response to a decision in the District of Alaska 
striking the Tongass exemption and reinstating the Roadless Rule,120 and 
as a means of relitigating in a new forum to avoid the Ninth Circuit’s 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1264. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1265. 
 116. Id. at 1266. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 1, Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 1:11-cv-
01122 (D.D.C. filed June 17, 2011). 
 120. Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 776 F. Supp. 2d 960, 976–
77 (D. Alaska 2011). 
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Lockyer precedent.121 The challenge focuses on the Tongass and Chugach 
national forests in Alaska, but also seeks to strike down the rule 
nationwide.122 While the case raises many of the same claims as previous 
challenges to the Rule,123 claims which have been rejected both by the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits, it also includes claims specific to Alaska: it is 
alleged that the Roadless Rule violates the Alaska National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”)124 and the Tongass Land 
Management Plan of 2008.125 
Alaska has filed pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act126 
and the Declaratory Judgment Act,127 alleging violations of ANILCA, the 
Tongass Timber Reform Act, the Wilderness Act, NFMA, NEPA, 
MUSYA, the Organic Administration Act, and the Administrative 
Procedure Act.128 Alaska recites nearly verbatim the argument presented 
in the District of Wyoming’s now overruled opinion.129 Alaska alleged  
that the USDA arbitrarily and capriciously denied multiple requests to 
extend the comment period, denied adequate information and maps to 
interested parties, denied requests from ten states to participate in the 
rulemaking as cooperating agencies, failed to consider adequate 
alternatives to “roadlessness,” and refused to provide an exception for 
access to new leasable minerals.130 Alaska further alleged that the 
ANILCA should never have been extended to the Tongass National 
Forest.131 
 
 121. See Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (“This case involves 
procedural challenges to a United States Forest Service rule, known commonly 
as the ‘Roadless Rule,’ with a potential environmental impact restricting 
development in national forest lands representing about two percent of the 
United States land mass.”). 
 122. Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 1, Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 1:11-cv-
01122 (D.D.C. filed June 17, 2011). 
 123. Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1209; California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., 575 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 124. 16 U.S.C. § 3101 (1980). 
 125. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶ 1. 
 126. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012). 
 127. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 (2012). 
 128. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶ 1. 
 129.  Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1319–20 (D. Wyo. 
2008). The State of Alaska apparently never contemplated that the Tenth Circuit 
would so soundly reject the reasoning of its lower court, and therefore assumed 
that the arguments it made in accordance with the opinion of the District of 
Wyoming would have a foregone conclusion in Alaska’s favor. Alaska will likely 
benefit from extensive briefing to downplay the significance of the Tenth Circuit 
decision overruling the District of Wyoming, as well as the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent decision to deny certiorari. 
 130. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 120, at ¶¶ 10–36. 
 131. Id. 
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A. Alaska’s Challenge Properly Belongs in the Ninth Circuit 
The State of Alaska is re-opening litigation on a new front, in what 
appears to be blatant forum shopping. There is a significant risk that by 
filing a second case in a different circuit, the State is attempting to 
circumvent stare decisis in the Ninth Circuit. 
While the operative facts and impact of this case are linked to the 
District of Columbia, they are more properly linked to the District of 
Alaska.132  It is undisputed law in the District of Columbia that “[w]hen 
the events occur in more than one district, a court can consider which 
jurisdiction has the stronger factual nexus to the claims.”133 The State of 
Alaska can claim that venue in the District of Columbia is proper 
because the subject matter of the suit, the application of the Roadless 
Rule and the enjoinment of the Tongass Exemption, arises out of and is 
connected with transactions that occurred in, and regulations 
promulgated by agencies headquartered in, the District of Columbia. 
This assertion, however, is not enough to overcome the more substantial 
nexus the State of Alaska has with the District of Alaska, in the Ninth 
Circuit. 
Courts in the District of Columbia, in particular amongst federal 
courts, examine venue challenges carefully in order “to guard against 
the danger that a plaintiff might manufacture venue in the District of 
Columbia.”134 The problem with Alaska filing in the District of 
Columbia is not only that it avoids stare decisis in the Ninth Circuit, but it 
forces defendants and intervenor-defendants in the controversy to 
relitigate claims previously tried and determined in the Ninth Circuit.  
In fact, several of the plaintiff’s claims have already been litigated in the 
Ninth Circuit Kootenai case, a decision supported by the Tenth Circuit 
Wyoming case.135 
Transferring this case to the District of Alaska serves the interests of 
justice in that it will discourage forum shopping by the plaintiff. The 
District of Columbia “cannot find that it is in the interest of justice to 
encourage, or even allow, a plaintiff to select one district exclusively or 
 
 132. See Wilderness Soc’y v. Babbitt, 104 F. Supp. 2d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2000). In 
prior litigation of a similar challenge to an agency rule, the extensive 
involvement of the Secretary of the Interior in the conduct of various 
environmental studies relating to the conduct of oil and gas resources in Alaska 
supported venue in D.C. because of “the national scope of the environmental 
issue.” Id. 
 133. Miller v. Insulation Contractors, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102 (D.D.C. 
2009). 
 134. Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 135. Discussed supra, Section II. 
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primarily to obtain or avoid specific precedents, particularly in 
circumstances such as these where the relevant law is unsettled and the 
choice of forum may well dictate the outcome of the case.”136 “[M]ere 
involvement . . . on the part of federal agencies, or some federal officials 
who are located in Washington, D.C. is not determinative” of whether 
the plaintiff’s choice of forum receives deference.137 
Because the focus of Alaska’s litigation in the District of Columbia 
is the Roadless Rule’s application in the State of Alaska, and this 
litigation is inextricably intertwined with the appeal in the Ninth Circuit 
requesting reinstatement of the Tongass Exemption, the District Court 
for the District of Columbia is an inappropriate venue. Alaska’s case 
should be transferred to a court in the Ninth Circuit for adjudication. 
B. The District of Columbia should follow the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits in upholding the Roadless Rule. 
Because NEPA, NFMA, MUSYA, and the Wilderness Act do not 
provide a private right of action, the court must review the Forest 
Service’s promulgation of the Roadless Rule as a “final agency action” 
under the Administrative Procedure Act.138 The Administrative 
Procedure Act provides for judicial review of final agency action, and 
requires the agency to have examined relevant data and to articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action.139 “The determination whether the 
[agency] acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner rests on whether it 
‘articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.’”140 
In its complaint to the District Court of the District of Columbia, the 
 
 136.  Schmidt Labs., Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 654 F. Supp. 
734, 737 (D.D.C. 1986); see also Turner & Newall PLC v. Canadian Universal Ins. 
Co., 652 F. Supp. 1308, 1312 (D.D.C. 1987); but see Cheeseman v. Carey, 485 F. 
Supp. 203, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), remanded, 623 F.2d 1387 (2d Cir. 1980) (opining 
that “[f]orum shopping is no more an evil than any other tactical determination 
a party makes in its behalf. Any competent lawyer chooses a forum with his or 
her client’s interest in mind.”). 
 137.  Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 2d 44, 47 
(D.D.C. 2009) (transferring case and refusing to defer to the plaintiffs’ choice of 
forum, despite the fact that “the administrative action at issue . . . arose in 
Washington”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Starnes v. 
McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 925 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc). 
 138. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012). 
 139. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 140. Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton, 348 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t. of Trans., 316 F.3d 1002, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
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State of Alaska alleges that the Roadless Rule violates ANILCA141 and 
the Tongass Timber Reform Act (“TTRA”)142 by setting aside nearly 15 
million acres of roadless areas in the Tongass and Chugach forests 
without congressional authorization.143 Even if these claims were 
appropriate for the District Court of the District of Columbia to review, 
rather than transferring them to the Ninth Circuit, where they are 
already being reviewed on appeal,144 they face a difficult battle. 
This appeal has weight, as the Tongass was initially regulated 
separately from the Roadless Rule and Alaska’s interests are directly 
injured by the application of the Rule to the Tongass National Forest.  
However, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have both reviewed the 
authority of the Forest Service to promulgate the Roadless Rule, and its 
compliance with NEPA procedure in doing so.145  While the State of 
Alaska claims that the Forest Service violated its mandate under the 
Organic Act and MUSYA,146 the Tenth Circuit has clearly stated that 
“the Forest Service had the authority to promulgate a rule protecting 
NFS lands through restrictions on commercial logging and road 
construction” under both Acts.147 The D.C. District Court is unlikely to 
reach a different conclusion than the Tenth Circuit on this issue, and 
Alaska faces an uphill battle in persuading the court of its position. 
Alaska also demands remedy for the violation of the Wilderness 
Act, alleging that the Roadless Rule mandates management of 
inventoried roadless areas in the national forests as de facto wilderness.148 
However, as discussed supra, the Tenth Circuit has definitively 
addressed this argument, holding that “the [inventoried roadless areas] 
governed by the Roadless Rule are not de facto [sic] administrative 
wilderness areas.”149 Almost anticipating Alaska’s argument, the court 
 
 141. 16 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012), et seq. Under ANILCA, Congress intended to 
preserve certain lands and waters in the State of Alaska “that contain nationally 
significant natural, scenic, historic, archeological, geological, scientific, 
wilderness, cultural, recreational, and wildlife values. . . .” Id. § 3101(a). 
 142. 16 U.S.C. § 539d (2012). The TTRA represents another Congressional 
attempt to legislate specifically to Alaska, providing for separate management of 
the Tongass National Forest. Id. 
 143. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶ 57. 
 144. See Order, Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 11-35517 
(9th Cir. filed June 17, 2011). 
 145. For discussion of the decisions in Wyoming v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 661 
F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2011) and Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094, (9th Cir. 2011), which 
reviewed the Forest Service’s authority to promulgate the Roadless Rule and its 
compliance with NEPA procedure, see supra Section II. 
 146. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶¶ 79–83. 
 147. Wyoming, 661 F.3d 1209, 1235 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 148. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶ 66. 
 149. Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1233. 
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specifically addressed the probable restrictions on mining interests, 
noting that “the Roadless Rule imposes no general prohibition on 
mining or mineral-development activities, other than the limitations 
imposed through the road-building prohibition[, and] the exceptions to 
the Roadless Rule’s road-building prohibition would also permit new 
road construction or reconstruction for mineral development in certain 
situations.”150 
In sum, the State of Alaska points to no language indicating the 
Tenth Circuit misread the statutes in question in its lengthy analysis of 
the legality of the Roadless Rule. Alaska alleges that the Forest Service 
violated its mandate under NFMA to manage each national forest in 
accordance with a comprehensive forest plan.151 However, the Tenth 
Circuit looked at Wyoming’s NFMA claim and held that it was not 
viable because the Roadless Rule was promulgated pursuant to the 
authority granted in the Organic Act and MUSYA, and therefore does 
not need to comply with the provisions of NFMA.152  The State of Alaska 
further alleges in its NEPA claims that the Forest Service repeatedly 
violated NEPA in promulgating the Roadless Conservation Areas 
regulation.153 Despite Alaska’s assertions of wrongdoing, the Ninth and 
Tenth Circuits both found no procedural violations under NEPA in the 
promulgation of the Roadless Rule.154  The D.C. District Court is again 
unlikely to stray from this holding in conflict with its sister courts. 
The State of Alaska reiterates the old argument that the Roadless 
Rule should be struck down nationwide as violating the Administrative 
Procedure Act.155 The Administrative Procedure Act requires an agency 
action to be held unlawful and set aside if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law” or in 
excess of statutory authority.156 However, as the State of Alaska’s prior 
six claims will likely fail, the District of Columbia cannot set aside the 
Roadless Rule, under these criteria, as arbitrary or capricious, not in 
accordance with the law, nor as action taken by the Forest Service in 
excess of its statutory authority.157 
Alaska’s best approach, if the case is to be transferred home to the 
Ninth Circuit, would be to abandon the arguments already well settled 
by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits and attack the rationale of the Kootenai 
 
 150. Id. at 1232–33. 
 151. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶¶ 67–70. 
 152. Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1271–72. 
 153.  Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶¶ 71–78. 
 154. Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); Wyoming, 661 F.3d at 1266. 
 155. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶¶ 84–91. 
 156. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
 157. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119, at ¶¶ 85–86. 
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II decision. The Kootenai II majority overturned the District of Idaho’s 
injunction based on its finding that the Roadless Rule furthered the 
substantive goals of NEPA.158 This position is inconsistent with 
precedent holding that NEPA is primarily a procedural act, with its 
substantive policy not legally enforceable.159  The majority went further, 
asserting that the “NEPA alternatives requirement [part of the EIS 
process] must be interpreted less stringently when the proposed agency 
action has a primary and central purpose to conserve and protect the 
natural environment.”160 This holding essentially allows an agency to 
violate the procedural requirements of NEPA so long as the substance of 
the action is pro-environment.161 This is the great weakness of the Ninth 
Circuit precedent, and the only place Alaska has a chance of success on 
the merits. However, at the end of the day it may not be enough to force 
an injunction of the Rule in the Ninth Circuit. 
Finally, the allegations that the Forest Service also violated the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act162 and the Administrative Procedure Act 
Section 706 are unique to Alaska. These allegations, as well as the 
ANILCA and TTRA claims, rightly belong in the Ninth Circuit with the 
appeal from the decision in Village of Kake.163 Alaska’s chance of 
prevailing in this manner is substantially higher, considering the lower 
threshold of proof of injury and a 2002 exemption from the Roadless 
Rule issued by the Forest Service itself. 
Alaska’s demand that this ruling be upheld despite the District of 
Alaska court’s decision has merit, because Alaska has a true injury to its 
interests and because the Forest Service had its opportunity to evaluate 
inclusion of the Tongass National Forest under the broad Roadless Rule. 
Regardless of whether this was the most environmentally protective rule 
 
 158. Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1123. 
 159. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (holding that while “NEPA does set forth significant 
substantive goals for the Nation . . . its mandate to the agencies is essentially 
procedural”); see also Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 
U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (“[W]e stated that NEPA, while establishing ‘significant 
substantive goals for the Nation,’ imposes upon agencies duties that are 
‘essentially procedural.’”); Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 87 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (“NEPA’s mandate ‘is essentially procedural . . . .’”); Ground Zero Ctr. for 
Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“Because NEPA is an ‘essentially procedural’ statute . . . .”). 
 160. Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1120. 
 161. See Cumings, supra note 18, at 816 (noting that the majority chastised the 
lower court for “‘[not] giving due weight to the public’s interest in conservation 
of natural resources’ . . . .” (citing Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1126)). 
 162. 5 U.S.C. § 601, et seq. (1980). 
 163. See Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t Agric., 776 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D. 
Alaska 2011), argued, No. 11-35517 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2012)). 
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possible, it was the rule lawfully chosen and promulgated by the Forest 
Service and lawfully applied in the State of Alaska.  Alaska’s interest is 
best served in focusing on its individual state rule, rather than fighting 
an uphill battle in the District Court of the District of Columbia. 
IV. RESTING EASIER, IF NOT EASY: THE FUTURE OF THE ROADLESS 
RULE 
Regardless of whether the D.C. District Court transfers Alaska’s 
challenge of the Roadless Rule to a more appropriate venue, the actual 
chance of a permanent injunction of the Roadless Rule is substantially 
lowered with the strong and reasonable voice of the Tenth Circuit 
joining that of the Ninth. Had Alaska’s case been heard by the D.C. 
District Court before the Tenth Circuit reinstated the Roadless Rule, or 
had the Tenth Circuit affirmed the injunction issued by the Wyoming 
District Court, the D.C. Circuit would have been compelled to choose 
one side of a circuit split. It is entirely possible that the D.C. District 
Court would have erred on the side of caution by enjoining the Rule. 
This circuit split would most certainly have forced the Roadless Rule 
before the Supreme Court.164 However, if the D.C. District Court and 
Court of Appeals now enjoin the Roadless Rule, they will be the 
minority voice in a circuit split, against the two circuits with the greatest 
interest in a valid Roadless regulation. 
The Roadless Rule continues to face opposition in Congress,165 in 
the Senate,166 and in the courts.167  The danger in the Roadless Rule 
getting to the Supreme Court is, of course, another permanent 
injunction, without an appellate court reversal. Under the leadership of 
Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court is notoriously reticent to affirm 
the unruly Ninth Circuit judges.168 
However, with the affirmation of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion by the 
Tenth Circuit, and the Supreme Court’s subsequent refusal to grant 
 
 164. THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, 5–6  (2010) (explaining that a “court of appeals [] 
enter[ing] a decision  in  conflict  with  the  decision  of  another  United States  
court  of  appeals  on the  same  important matter” is one of the main issues the 
Court considers in granting certiorari). 
 165. See Wilderness and Roadless Area Release Act of 2011, H.R. 1581, 112th 
Cong. (2011). 
 166.  See Wilderness and Roadless Area Release Act of 2011, S. 1087, 112th 
Cong. (2011). 
 167. See Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 119. 
 168. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Disorder in the Court, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2007 
(“The Supreme Court reviewed 22 cases from the 9th Circuit [during the 2006] 
term, and it reversed or vacated 19 times.”). 
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certiorari for the appeal of the Tenth Circuit’s decision, the burden is 
now on Alaska to convince judges from the District Court and Court of 
Appeals of the District of Columbia that the reasoning of two separate 
Appellate panels have been arbitrary and capricious.  Even should the 
State of Alaska succeed in convincing the D.C. Circuit to rule differently 
than the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, convincing the Supreme Court to 
uphold a nationwide injunction or repeal of the Roadless Rule seems 
unlikely, especially given its refusal to hear the appeal of Wyoming.169  
CONCLUSION 
The tumultuous history of the Roadless Rule in the courts of this 
nation continues, even after the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have issued 
decisions recognizing its validity. The potential circuit split that once 
seemed inevitable now seems more like a well-reasoned accord in the 
higher courts on the legality and enforceability of the Roadless Rule. 
Though the danger exists that the case will create a split and the 
Supreme Court will seize the opportunity to grant certiorari and take on 
the Ninth Circuit once again, it is unlikely to overrule the Tenth Circuit 
as well. It seems, at least for now, that the Roadless Rule is safe to 
continue protecting the pristine areas from exploitation and 
overdevelopment—to keep the wild places wild and the wild things as 
they are. 
 
 
 
 169. Greg Stohr, High Court Rejects Appeal Over Forest “Roadless Rule”, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com 
/news/2012-10-01/high-court-rejects-appeal-over-forest-roadless-rule. 
